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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS. — *Am. J. Ps.* = *American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *Phil. Stud.* = *Philosophische Studien*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *R. I. d. Fil.* = *Rivista Italiana di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*; *Phil. Jahr.* = *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGICAL.

The Logic of Geometry. B. A. W. RUSSELL. *Mind*, No. 17, pp. 1-23.

Three points are discussed in this article: (1) The Axiom of Congruence, (2) The Axiom of Dimensions, (3) The Straight Line. Since geometry deals with the comparison and relations of spatial magnitude, and a definition of spatial magnitude reduces itself to a definition of spatial equality, we require at the outset some criterion of spatial equality. Euclid gives the requisite axiom in the form, 'Magnitudes which exactly coincide are equal'; but he really means that the two magnitudes have to be *brought* into coincidence by the motion of one or both of them. This criterion implies the Axiom of Congruence, namely, that mere motion cannot alter shapes; for it is evident that, if spatial magnitudes could not be moved without distortion, this test of equality would break down. The denial of this axiom involves the notion, philosophically absurd, that mere space *per se* can act on things; and geometry, if it refused to accept this axiom, would have to set up another far more arbitrary assumption, namely, that shapes varied during motion in accordance with a definite law. — The Axiom of Dimensions is that space must have a finite integral number of dimensions. The proof is that position, being relative, must be defined by some definite number of relations, and each of these relations constitutes a dimension. The limitation of dimensions to three is empirical; nevertheless, since *small* errors are out of the question, it is not so liable to the inaccuracy and uncertainty which usually belong to empirical knowledge. — If points are

defined simply by relations to other points, or if all position is relative, every point must have to every other point one, and only one, relation independent of the rest of space. This relation is the distance between the two points. It must be measured by some curve which joins the two points, and, if it is to have a unique value, it must be measured by a curve which these two points completely define. But such a curve is a straight line, for a straight line is the only curve determined by any two of its points. Hence, if two points are to have to each other a determinate relation without reference to any other point or figure in space, space must allow of straight lines.

DAVID IRONS.

Sense, Meaning, and Interpretation. V. WELBY. Mind, No. 17, pp. 24-37; No. 18, pp. 186-202.

Although the disadvantages and dangers arising from the present failure of language to express more than roughly what is termed Meaning or Sense are generally recognized, no systematic attempt to attack these at their root has hitherto been made. Neither the process of interpretation nor the conception of Meaning have so far received adequate treatment. This leads to the loss of distinctions valuable for thought, and to a low average of interpreting power. Attention is here called to (1) the neglect, especially in education, of any careful study of the conditions of Meaning and its interpretation, and (2) the advantages which must accrue from such study. Much is lost by the present dearth of means of expression, and of training in their use. There is not even a word to express what happens when a given excitation suggests something other than itself, thus becoming a 'sign' and acquiring 'sense.' The word 'sensify' is proposed for this. Works on science and philosophy, and especially on logic and psychology, supply ample witness — both conscious and unconscious — to the need for a special study of Meaning, which might be called Sensifics, as no term already in use covers enough ground. Such a study, so far from being impossible, seems indicated and called for on every side, and might be made not only practical but attractive even to the youngest child. At present language betrays, largely from the absence of such a training, a disastrous lack of power to adapt itself to the growing needs of experience. But this power would soon be generally acquired as the result of the training here suggested, and would even to a certain extent follow a general awakening to the importance of the question. Definition,

though useful in its own sphere, must not be regarded as a solution of the difficulty. Ambiguity is an inherent characteristic of language, as of other forms of organic function. Thought may suffer from a too mechanical precision in speech. Meaning is sensitive to psychological 'climate.' Both philosophers and scientists complain bitterly of the evils arising from an inadequate nomenclature and terminology. We all alike, in fact, suffer and lose by this, and by the endless disputation it entails. It rests with education to initiate the needed 'fresh start.' It is incumbent upon English teachers and thinkers to lead the way, since our language is admitted even by foreigners to have peculiar facilities for inquiries and studies of this kind. Meanwhile, it will be something to realize at once more clearly some potent causes of present obscurity and confusion, and the directions in which we may hope for efficient practical remedy.

AUTHOR'S SUMMARY.

PSYCHOLOGICAL.

Mémoire et reconnaissance. H. BERGSON. Rev. Ph., XXI, 3, pp. 225-248; XXI, 4, pp. 380-399.

Memory has two functions, and the failure to distinguish between them has been the source of much confusion. *Pure* memory is retention—the mere record of an event set in its proper place in the 'past.' The second function of memory appears in the formation of a habit by repetition. Pure memory emerges in the form of images which represent events in the individual's history. By repetition the image loses its individuality as a past event, and becomes a tendency to action in the organism. In the simplest forms of recognition it produces a motor reaction to the presentation, and this reaction gives the feeling of familiarity. Thus a motor habit due to repetition is the basis of recognition. Here no centrally aroused image is necessary. Only the presentation occupies the mind. (An example of this is the dog's recognition of his master.) It requires an advanced stage of mental development to abstract from the present and to attend to a representation of the past. The most simple kind of recognition is of objects useful to the organism. If, now, abstraction is made from the utility of an object, and its *nature* is considered, images which form conscious fringes arise and

unite with the elements of the presentation. We now have attentive perception. In the state of attention a circuit is formed between the mind and the object. There is a constant succession of afferent currents and returning centrifugal currents, the latter bearing constant reënforcement from the central stores to the periphery along centrifugal sensory tracts. As attention increases, the elements of the presentation are more and more emphasized, and images more and more remote are called up. The images sometimes coalesce so completely with the perception that they are not distinguished from the thing presented. For example, in reading, only occasional letters are really seen, the central images supplying the gaps. — Recognition and attention are best studied in hearing. Sounds and their interpretation furnish all stages of attentive perception. The confused buzz of an unknown language becomes intelligible speech by a coördinated motor accompaniment. This latter may furnish only a *scheme*, a mere outline, given by muscular reaction, possible even in motor aphasia. It is a bodily attitude. The order of disappearance of word-classes in motor aphasia (names, common nouns, verbs) indicates that imitative bodily activity accompanies words expressive of action. These are longest retained. — Attentive perception, then, is only realized by the coalescence of sensations, accompanied by a “motor scheme,” with images of the memory. These two factors are represented by two currents—a centripetal and a centrifugal—which form a closed circuit in the state of attention. The sensory centres are excited from two sides—by impressions of sense from one side, and by central excitations from the other. Where the central excitants are lacking, as in psychical deafness, there is no arousal of images. Pure memory is no more a repository of ‘images’ than the sense organs are of real objects. Instead of one central organ of apperception, there are organs of *perception virtuelle* influenced by the memory, as the peripheral organs of sense are influenced by objects. This theory is substantiated by the phenomena of aphasia. The process characteristic of recognition is not from the perception to the idea, but centrifugal—from the idea to the perception.

I. M. BENTLEY.

Zur Kritik des Seelenbegriffs: einige Bemerkungen beim Studium der Wundt'schen Psychologie. ALLEN VANNÉRUS. Ar. f. sys. Ph., I, 3, pp. 363–400.

It is hard to say precisely what theory of the nature of the soul is held by Wundt. On the one hand, he vigorously opposes the

doctrine of a substance behind conscious states, and in so doing seems to ignore the permanent factor in consciousness. He makes the soul-life an immediate reality, whose essence is activity; but he emphasizes the activity so strongly that it seems to pass over into mere change. On the other hand, in his criticisms of the associational psychology, he approaches closely to the substance theory. The author's own position is that, although there is no substance behind soul-life, yet the soul-life itself is substance—in the sense that it has a constant factor, which cannot be found in the psychic manifold, but is the original psychic element.

ELLEN B. TALBOT.

Some Observations on the Anomalies of Self-Consciousness.

JOSIAH ROYCE. Psych. Rev., II, 5, pp. 433-457; II, 6, pp. 574-584.

Self-conscious functions are all, in their primary aspect, social functions arising from human intercourse. They involve a contrast between Ego and non-Ego: primarily that between self-experience and an experience attributed to another, secondarily that between one's inner states and represented external realities. In the former case, the Ego includes modifications of the common sensibility and "feelings of the sense of control"; the non-Ego is colder, more localized, and less controllable. Emotional states and modifications of the common sensibility, which uniformly accompany social reflexes, become associated with memories and ideas of social situations, and always, when repeated, recall them. Self-consciousness may arise from remembered or imagined social situations involving particular contrasts of Ego and non-Ego, and is colored by emotional suggestions of such situations. Reflective self-consciousness may arise from any passing content involving contrasts which recall the social contrast between Ego and non-Ego, or which excite to acts involving social habits. A case involving anomalies of self-consciousness is described by Professor Royce in great detail. He reaches the conclusion that these anomalies are (1) such primary alterations of conscious content as suggest anomalous social situations, contrasts, or functions; or (2) primary anomalies in social habits.

C. S. PARRISH.

Die Aufmerksamkeit und die Funktion der Sinnesorgane. W.

HEINRICH. Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn., IX, 5 and 6, pp. 342-388.

This article is the first of a series in which the author is to present his theory of attention, in accordance with the principles and methods stated at the close of his recently published pamphlet, *Die moderne physiologische Psychologie in Deutschland*.¹ The first part of the present article is a restatement of the position taken in the earlier publication, with a brief reference to the points in which the author most strongly objects to the theories of attention advanced by Wundt, Külpe, Ziehen, and Münsterberg. This problem can be solved only in the following way. Before the investigation begins all external influences must be carefully noted; then we must know all the objective changes occasioned by these influences; and finally, the testimony of the individual observed must be taken into account. The second part of the paper is an account of experiments performed in Exner's laboratory in Vienna to show the relation between the accommodation of the eye and attention. Helmholtz had maintained that attention was independent of such accommodation. His instance of the possibility of fixing the eye upon a point, and yet of directing the attention to an object on one side of the field of vision, has often been quoted, and has been accepted on the authority of Helmholtz' name. Heinrich's experiments, however, show that the eye does change if the attention is directed to one side of the field of vision, or if it is occupied with some mental problem. The changes in curvature and in the diameter of the pupil were carefully measured, and the tabulated results show a certain constancy of optical conditions, according as attention is directed to the centre or side of the field of vision, or to some mental problem. In the third and last division the oscillations of attention are discussed. The author agrees with Münsterberg in maintaining that the oscillations are due to peripheral changes, but he admits that Münsterberg was mistaken in assigning as the chief cause changes in the respiratory muscles. Heinrich asserts that the oscillations are caused by changes in the accommodation of the lens.

ALICE J. HAMLIN.

Idées concrètes et images sensibles. L. WEBER. Rev. de Mét., IV, 1, pp. 34-61.

The difference between sense images and ideas is usually considered from the standpoint of abstract general concepts. The differ-

¹ Cf. notice of this work in the present number of the REVIEW, p. 440.

ence comes out much more clearly when we take a concrete idea, or, better still, the so-called 'singular idea' as denoted by a proper name. A number of people are discussing an absent person, M. Each person has, besides the name, some sort of a sense image of M, an image probably differing from the images which other persons have. But the object each one *means* must be identical, otherwise the discussion would be impossible. This common object of *thought* is not, then, a sensible image; it is ideal. But what is an idea in this sense? It is the common attitude, the common *mode of activity* involved in all these different images. While the images *as such* may differ for each person, each one involves a system of connections, a mode of habitual activity. This is the idea, the object, of which objective existence, truth, or falsity can be affirmed. — This mode of activity becomes fixed upon and abstracted by attention only under social conditions. The idea as objective logical existence, is a function of communication; hence is essentially social. It is true or false according as, when carried into action, social harmony or discord results. Truth and falsity have no meaning except as applied to this function of the idea in its social aspect. — Metaphysically considered, the idea presents the social phase of reality, viz., that of objective, logical existence, the reality of discursive thought. Both self and the external world are ideas, and belong to this reality. Both are equally objective and equally real. That this thought realm is only one phase of reality is evident from the emotional, moral, and aesthetic experiences in which the self and the world, ideas as such, drop out. The Unknowable cannot be said, except by contradiction in terms, to belong to this phase of reality. The only Unknowable is the sensible in consciousness upon which ideation has not "imposed the logical form of existence." A. W. MOORE.

Consciousness and Time. C. A. STRONG. Psych. Rev., III, 2, pp. 149-157.

In opposition to the theory of Professor James that there is "literally no such datum" as present time, the author maintains that reality, as we know it, may in fact be said to be nothing but one ever-changing present. A changing consciousness is not the same thing as a consciousness of change. Past and present and future must be included in one unitary state in order to be known at all. Our consciousness of the past, however near or remote, is representative; our consciousness of the present is direct, intuitive.

We may speak of a continuity, but not of a unity, of successive states. The only unity is the unity of that which is in consciousness at once.

ALICE J. HAMLIN.

A Study of Visual and Aural Memory Processes. L. G. WHITEHEAD. Psych. Rev., III, 3, pp. 258-269.

The experimenter tested the validity of the Ebbinghaus-Müller-Schumann method with reference to three questions, and arrived at the following answers: (1) Most of the subjects memorized the nonsense syllables more rapidly from visual than from auditory representations. (2) Matter memorized aurally seemed to be more easily retained. (3) When syllables were memorized by means of one sense, and then presented a week later to another sense, there was an evident diminution in the time required to memorize them.

ALICE J. HAMLIN.

Reaction Time: A Study in Attention and Habit. J. R. ANGELL and A. W. MOORE. Psych. Rev., III, 3, pp. 245-258.

The interpretation of the results of these experiments, on the basis of the interrelation of habit and attention, is an attempt to reconcile the main points in dispute between the Leipzig school and Professor Baldwin, in regard to reaction types. In both 'motor' and 'sensory' reactions, the act of attention is the coördinating of the two groups of stimuli coming from both hand and ear. The focus of the attention upon the more habitual phase of the process means its resolution into elements. Hence we should expect the reaction to be shortest when attention is upon that part of the process which is least habitual. The ear adjustment is more stable than that of the hand, so that the motor form is likely to have the faster time.

ALICE J. HAMLIN.

ETHICAL.

The Ethics of Religious Conformity. HENRY SIDGWICK. Int. J. E., VI, 3, pp. 273-290.

What is the duty of the progressive, or—to use a neutral term—the deviating, element in a religious community with regard to the expression of their convictions? This question is important,

since it concerns our attitude toward the Church, the great moralizing agency of our society. It is at present especially insistent, since the spirit of tolerance is leaving room for laxity of principle, and the progress of scientific knowledge is constantly furnishing us with new views which are not yet thought out, thus leading us to open and careless inconsistency. Rejecting extreme positions, we conclude that "while we should yield full sympathy and respect to the motives that prompt a man to cling to a religious community whose influence he values, even though he has ceased to hold beliefs which the community has formally declared to be essential; and while we should concede broadly the legitimacy of such adhesion, still all such concessions must be strictly limited by the obligations of veracity and good faith." This general principle is to be justified from the Utilitarian standpoint, since the day of teaching by means of deception is passing away.

ALEX. MEIKLEJOHN.

The Morality that Is. ALFRED HODDER. Int. J. E., VI, 3, pp. 338-356.

In society, individuals (or minorities) are usually compelled to do those things, the doing of which brings more of good to society than of harm to the individual, and to leave undone those things, the doing of which brings more of harm to society than of good to the individual. Wrong conduct is conduct by which the individual intends to profit himself at the expense of society; right conduct is that by which the individual intends to sacrifice himself for the benefit of society (*i.e.*, the majority or the ruling minority). Apart from social interference, a man tends naturally to profit by the wrong he does and to suffer by the right. Moral rules are binding on us, because we as individuals are within the scope of social seizure and punishment. There are of course as many actual codes of morality (Moralities that Are), as there are societies. No matter what the society is, whether it is a camping party, or a band of robbers, or a nation, its rules and prohibitions constitute a moral code. The logical outcome of all this is, that there is almost nothing from the standpoint of Morality that Is, or rather from the standpoint of the Moralities that Are, that is not at once both right and wrong. The Rationalist finds in the Morality that Is, as in the Morality that Ought to Be, an utter conflict of obligations and ideals, and no *rational* ground of decision between them. One object, no matter how abominable, is in the eyes of logic as good as any other to the man

who values it as highly. There is no central superior standard of conduct or morality ; there is only greater inclination — and superior force.

J. F. BROWN.

The Conflict between the Old and the New: A Retrospect and a Prospect. HARALD HÖFFDING. Int. J. E., VI, 3, pp. 322-338.

Admitting evolution as a fact, the question yet remains whether the changes which have occurred have been a gain or a loss to the race. Is there persistence, not only of energy, but of value, in the domain of thought ? Modern psychology has shown the possibility of the persistence, under new forms, of the energy manifested in the earlier stages of mental life, but there is no certainty that the value of the new form is equal to that of the old. The time when instinct and authority give way to clear thinking marks an important period in mental development ; and the question arises whether the energy at work under the old order will persist with equal value under the new. Rousseau, Lessing, and Kant recognized the problem. While mercilessly criticising the old forms they did not attempt to live on criticism alone. They expected, each in his own way, a "third kingdom" that should unite the old spirit of authority with the new spirit of criticism. This was Kant's greatest work. The schools of Romanticism and Positivism are both Kantian in spirit. Fichte, Saint-Simon, Hegel, Comte, and Carlyle, all look toward the establishment of the "third kingdom," thus indicating their belief in continuous evolution. It would seem, however, that there are some who do not desire this, *e.g.*, those who blindly support old church creeds, or those who rejoice at the dissolution which criticism is working. But even here there is more change going on than can be recognized by one in the midst of it. As to the special nature of the new era, there is of course a wide difference of opinion. Only its general features may be indicated, *viz.*, the union of concentrated force and wide diversity, of firm faith and free criticism, of social organization and individual liberty. The solution of our problem may be suggested by the fact, that whatever has filled an essential place in mental life cannot drop out without compensation. The power and nature of personality are not well understood, but it is through marked individual variations that each successive "third kingdom" is to be discovered and established. The philosopher has to examine the value of both the old and the new, and out of both to construct a new thought-life.

J. F. BROWN.

HISTORICAL.

Une nouvelle hypothèse sur Anaximandre. P. TANNERY. Ar.
f. G. Ph., VIII, 4, pp. 443-448.

This article opens with a criticism of Burnet's contention (in *Early Greek Philosophy*) that the first Greek philosophers used the word ἀήρ, as Homer did, to signify mist or vapor; and that Empedocles was the first to discover that what we now call 'air' is corporeal, and is not identical with empty space. This view deserves serious consideration, as it contains in any case part of a new truth. In refusing to accept Burnet's opinion unreservedly, Tannery maintains that, even before the time of the Physiologists, the Greeks did not regard as the void that which was apparently empty. Homer conceived the seeming void as occupied either by vapor, more or less transparent, or by breaths of wind. Further, while it is true that Empedocles uses αἰθήρ instead of ἀήρ, to denote the matter which fills the seeming void, this merely proves that the current use of ἀήρ was the same as in Homeric times. It does not prove that Anaximenes had not already used ἀήρ to mean the invisible air. The author then quotes certain passages which make it clear, he thinks, that Anaximenes used the word in this sense. From the point of view thus gained, he then inquires how Anaximenes, in giving a material form to the indeterminate Unlimited of Anaximander, came to choose a form whose real existence would not have been admitted by his contemporaries. This question can be easily answered if we admit that the invisible 'Air' of Anaximenes and the Unlimited of Anaximander are one and the same thing. It is easy to understand why the latter did not call his principle ἀήρ, for the word in his time signified something visible. This theory would establish a hitherto un hoped-for continuity between Anaximander, Anaximenes, and the earliest of the Pythagoreans. Tannery then explains how the first-mentioned thinker must have conceived the origin of the universe. In mid-air, when the atmosphere is clear and undisturbed (*i.e.*, in the seeming void), we sometimes see a light mist form and gradually take definite shape. It seems to separate itself from the being of the limitless space from which it springs. In some such way as this, Anaximander pictured the beginning of things.

DAVID IRONS.

Der λόγος Σωκρατικός. KARL JOËL. Ar. f. G. Ph., VIII, 4, pp. 466-483.

The author maintains that there is no good reason for marking off the earlier Platonic dialogues as 'Socratic.' Such an arrangement is purely arbitrary, and partakes of the nature of a half-hearted compromise. As a matter of fact, the Greek writings in which Socrates figures were not meant to give a historically accurate account of Socrates' disputations or general attitude. They must be regarded as imitations rather than reproductions. The Socratic form was merely the conventional way in which the authors expressed their own opinions. Joël criticises Zeller, and cites in support of his position a passage from the *Poetics* (1147 b), in which Aristotle places under the head of 'imitation' the kind of writing referred to. But if this is so, Joël concludes, we cannot, without any more ado, deduce anything as to the true character of Socrates from statements of different Socratic writers which happen to agree. His own opinion is that Socrates was preëminently a dialectician, and should be called 'the founder of logic' rather than 'the founder of ethics.'

DAVID IRONS.

Plato's Earlier Theory of Ideas. R. P. HARDIE. Mind, No. 18, pp. 167-185.

In this article an attempt is made to approach Plato's theory of Ideas through his logic. For this purpose a careful study is made of a passage in the *Republic* (504 D-534 E). Some of the points brought out—which must not, however, be taken as formal conclusions in regard to the general nature of the doctrine of Ideas—are the following: (1) The Idea is the metaphysical equivalent of a definition (*εἶδος* = *λόγος*), 'definition' being for Plato a general formula of scientific thought. The earlier form of the doctrine of Ideas seems to overestimate the importance of the meaning of a term in connotation, as distinguished from its meaning in denotation. (2) The particulars are sometimes spoken of as *resembling* the Idea, and sometimes as *sharing* in it. (3) The nature of the individual is not explained. Two contrary Ideas have nothing in common, and yet an individual may partake of both. Again, we are not told how the particular is differentiated from the Idea that it resembles.

ELLEN B. TALBOT.

The Conception of Immortality in Spinoza's "Ethics." A. E. TAYLOR. *Mind*, No. 18, pp. 145-166.

While Spinoza certainly does not believe in personal immortality, there are several reasons for holding that his doctrine of an eternal element in the mind refers to some kind of existence after death. (1) Although 'eternity' means, not indefinite duration, but scientific necessity, still endless duration is a *consequence* of eternity. (2) Adequate thinking frees us from the fear of death. (3) Spinoza speaks of "the duration of the mind without relation to the body." The author explains his conception of Spinoza's doctrine of immortality as follows. In a sense everything is eternal; but the mind alone *knows* its eternity, *i.e.*, views things in their systematic connections. The only mental activities which survive after death are adequate knowledge and the intellectual love called forth by it. All the personal and individual elements of the mind die with the body; but, when an adequate idea has once been thought, it becomes a permanent addition to the world's scientific knowledge.

ELLEN B. TALBOT.

Leibnitz and Protestant Theology. JOHN WATSON. *New World*, No. 17, pp. 102-122.

This article is an exposition and criticism of the defence of theology in the *Théodicée*. Leibnitz' distinction between contingent and necessary truths cannot be accepted, since whatever is true is necessary. His theory that the world was chosen by God from an infinite number of possible worlds is also untenable, because for an infinite mind the possible would be the actual. But, though imperfectly formulated, the doctrine contains an important truth: to say that the world is essentially imperfect is to deny its complete rationality; and an irrational universe is a contradiction in terms.

ELLEN B. TALBOT.

Friedrich Nietzsche, eine moral-philosophische Silhouette. G. SIMMEL. *Z. f. Ph.*, CVII, 2, pp. 202-215.

The ethical views of Nietzsche have been unduly neglected by professional philosophers because of their aphoristic and poetical form. They can, however, easily be represented as a coherent whole, to which a place must be assigned in the history of ethics. The revolutionary

and 'Copernican' feat N. accomplished, was to invert ethical standards. Whereas, formerly, the individual and individual development and welfare were regarded as means to the end of the general development of mankind, N. conversely regards the welfare of the masses as justifiable and desirable, only as means to the production of a great, powerful, and aesthetically complete personality. Instead of the individual deriving his moral value from his social function, we here have the moral value of society estimated by the great men it is able to produce. The change is so fundamental that there can be no question of 'refuting' N. on the basis of the ordinary ethics. It is, moreover, a misapprehension to regard him as a cynic or an epicurean, for, however ruthless the great man is in his treatment of others, he sacrifices himself also for the sake of the ideal he strives to realize. Simmel regards N. as having worn himself out in the attempt practically to realize this conception of the "over-man."

F. C. S. S.